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When there are no strikes or natural disasters, travelling
usually is a pleasure. Some of us have returned from the
annual conference of the American Society for Bioethics
and Humanities in San Diego, while others have good
memories of the 10th World Congress of Bioethics in
Singapore last summer. But not only bioethicists are trav-
elling, bioethics itself is as well, following the globaliza-
tion of health care and medical research. Anthropologist
Petryna (2009), in her interesting book When experiments
travel, has shown how the clinical trials industry has
moved into the developing countries, using the poor as
research subjects and ignoring all the norms that have been
established in the developed world.
Bioethics has become a global concern and has now
really moved into a new stage involving all countries and
cultures. This issue of the journal testiﬁes of this expansion
of the scope of bioethics.
However, there are different perspectives on the glob-
alization of bioethics. In this issue, Gielen et al. (2011)
report about the attitudes of palliative care professionals in
New Delhi towards withholding life-sustaining treatment.
The need for palliative care exists everywhere. It is there-
fore interesting to study how non-treatment decisions are
made in other countries. The authors refer to the speciﬁc
context in India, such as the legal provisions that facilitate
that refusal of life-sustaining treatment can be regarded as
suicide, making physicians reluctant to withdraw or with-
hold such treatment. The authors also, though succinctly,
refer to the socio-economic context, pointing out that
ﬁnancial considerations play an important role in treatment
decisions. Regardless of these different contexts, however,
the respondents use more or less the same normative
framework for decisions to withhold life-sustaining treat-
ment as in the West. It is difﬁcult to know how represen-
tative the opinions of less than 30 physicians and nurses in
various palliative care settings in New Delhi are for palli-
ative care professionals in India. After all, the respondents
are highly educated people, imbued with the attitudes of
palliative care and not much inﬂuenced by Hindu beliefs.
But the study demonstrates that there are two different
research approaches to global bioethical issues. One
approach is to study other countries to examine how ethical
problems are perceived, presented, addressed, for example
to examine how treatment decisions in palliative care are
made in India or other countries. We can apply the usual
research methods with the standard questionnaire and
hypothetical cases to gauge the opinions of colleagues in
India. The results often trigger a response similar to the
exclamation of surprise of Western tourists in Bangkok or
Nairobi: ‘it is just like home’—‘they have everything we
have’. Modern health care is universal, medicine is almost
the same everywhere, and people have similar diseases.
Why should bioethics be different? Everybody who leaves
the main roads and looks beyond the glamorous buildings
ﬁndsadifferentreality.Nairobihasoneofthevastestslumps
in Africa, while Bangkok has huge areas of cardboard huts
‘sheltering’ illegal laborers from the Northern provinces.
PalliativecareinIndiaisﬁne,butcanweignorethecontext?
Indiaisavastcountry,with 25%ofthe populationbelow the
poverty line. The majority of the population has no access to
healthcare;only10%ofthepopulationhashealthinsurance.
There is a shortage of doctors and nurses, and a signiﬁcant
lack of hospital beds. Even if there are adequate health
facilities, basic sanitation is lacking. There is no city at
the moment with full-day water supply. Within this context,
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does not mean that studying them is irrelevant, but it is like
staying in the Hilton Hotel in downtown Nairobi: comfort-
able but isolated.
The other approach is to study what speciﬁc problems
health professionals actually are facing in a vast and
diverse country like India. An example is provided in an
earlier publication in this journal (Chattopadhyay and
Simon 2008). The authors of this study explicitly attend to
the context in which individuals understand the meaning of
illness, suffering and death. How physicians, patients and
family communicate is profoundly inﬂuenced by culture,
particularly in regard to end-of-life decisions. Their ﬁnd-
ings are different from Gielen et al. When illness is a
shared family affair, the diagnosis of a fatal disease is often
not communicated to the patient; advanced directives are
virtually non-existent; the family makes all decisions. The
implication is that the usual normative framework can no
longer be applied, and needs to be reformulated from
within the perspective of the country and the culture.
Similar challenges were faced in a research project
described in another publication in this issue, from the
same research group in Louvain (Van den Branden and
Broeckaert 2011). The researchers studied English online
fatwas in the ﬁeld of end-of-life ethics. The rapidly
increasing number of e-fatwas in itself is a symptom of
globalization of a traditional religion and is apparently
related to the struggle for normative authority in present-
day Islamic bioethics. But the new media will not neces-
sarily convey a new message. Basically using the same
conceptual framework on treatment decisions in advanced
disease as in India, this time the researchers were surprised
to ﬁnd out that the fatwas did not follow the framework.
Islamic arguments do not make a difference between vol-
untary euthanasia, non-voluntary euthanasia and assisted
suicide. Of course, it would have been an even bigger
surprise, if fatwas of an ancient religion would have been
promulgated according to the conceptual structure recently
invented by theologians in Louvain. Studying Islamic
bioethics requires immersion in the Islamic world view and
reasoning. Even the suggestion that the practice might be
different, and that perhaps the actual and concrete decision-
making process might be following the researchers’
framework, presupposes the typically western distinction
between normative ideas and normative practice.
Taking seriously the bioethical questions and answers in
different countries, cultures and religions implies not to
impose a particular normative framework but to do as
much justice as possible to the normative considerations
and concerns existing in these different contexts. This is
why the above studies are important. We need to know in
detail and with precision what are the ethical problems in
other communities and regions, what are the strategies of
argumentation and justiﬁcation used, and what are the
approaches and solutions to address these problems. But
bioethics is not anthropology. This phase of exploration
and clariﬁcation should just be the starting-point for what
seems to be essential in genuine bioethics: normative
analysis. However, often the research never reaches this
point; it is jammed in the empirical domain. It provides
excellent descriptions but no normative judgment. What
seems to be presented as bioethics is in reality anthropol-
ogy. An example is the above mentioned book by Petryna.
She provides an excellent narrative of internationalization
of clinical trials but she does not make a critical judgment.
In fact her book is a long history of exploitation, social
injustice and manipulation of regulations.
Another problem surfaces when normative judgments
are indeed made on the basis of empirical research: ethical
relativism and particularism. What is considered as right
or wrong in the healthcare setting depends on the socio-
cultural context. Ethical conclusions are drawn on the
basis of the anthropological approach but they are always
situated within the speciﬁc culture. An example offer
Chattopadhyay and De Vries (2008). They argue that
modern bioethics is a typical Western phenomenon. It is
born in the West and therefore will always have the
birthmarks of Western civilization. When it is globalised,
it will have become the agent of moral imperialism. This
argument seems to demonstrate modesty and respect for
cultural diversity. Who are we to impose our judgment on
another culture? Nobody wants to be considered a bio-
ethical imperialist. But in real practice this argument
might also be fallacious and even unjust. It is a fallacy
because the genesis of an activity is not identical to its
validity. Our number system is inherited from the Arab
culture. We are not accusing the Arabs of colonialism
since they have imposed their number system on us. It
would be difﬁcult to do that anyway since the Arabic
numerals have been inherited from the Hindus in India.
The argument is also unjust. It is ‘doublespeak’ to justify
conditions and circumstances that are reproachable from
the point of view of universal values. ‘Asian values’ for
example have often been promoted to justify authoritarian
regimes. But, as Sen (1997) has shown, the so-called
Asian values are not especially Asian in any signiﬁcant
sense. It is a kind of ‘moral protectionism’ to continue to
regard basic ethical notions and human rights as ‘‘Western
values’’ that cannot be exported to other cultures. It is
useful to quote Sen’s conclusion: ‘‘Our ideas of political
and personal rights have taken their particular form rela-
tively recently, and it is hard to see them as ‘‘traditional’’
commitments of Western cultures. There are important
antecedents of those commitments, but those antecedents
can be found plentifully in Asian cultures as well as
Western cultures’’ (1997, p. 38).
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